The full anatomy of a phishing site,
one URL at a time.
ZeroPhish renders the page, runs twelve detection signals against the DOM, certificate chain, brand fingerprint and threat feeds, and returns a typed verdict. Built for security teams and product engineers.
Phishing detected
| URL | hxxps://pesquisabr[.]online/inicio/ | |
| Host | pesquisabr[.]online | |
| Screenshot | https://cdn.zerophish.ai/eec51401-35b7-4262-b983-e89e6258a35c.jpg | |
| Scan ID | 6b8db53c-336b-4634-9eee-f80b7b51751e |
No brand impersonation signals available.
| Host | pesquisabr.online |
| Registered domain | pesquisabr.online |
| Scheme | https |
| Content length | 46773 B |
| HTTP | 200 · text/html |
| DMARC policy | none |
| SPF policy | soft |
| MX records | present |
The page presents itself as an “educational” platform to “consulte gratuitamente seu CPF” (check your CPF) and says it has “Sem vínculo com bancos ou órgãos oficiais.” The HTML contains no visible login/credential form, password field, or payment/OTP collection, and it explicitly claims “Nenhum dado sensível é solicitado.”
However, the domain (pesquisabr.online) is not associated with any official CPF authority and the copy promises to identify “registros financeiros vinculados” that users may expect from government/financial institutions. While the current HTML looks like a lead-in landing page (“Iniciar consulta”) rather than a direct form submission, it still could be part of a multi-step flow that later collects personal data. Overall, evidence of active credential harvesting is insufficient, so the verdict is conservative.
Suspicious signals are present primarily at the branding/authority level (independent platform vs. CPF-related promise) and the generic marketing/redirect parameters, but no direct phishing form elements were found in the provided content.
This is a confirmed phishing operation impersonating Serasa (Brazilian credit bureau). The landing page at /inicio/ poses as an “educational CPF consultation platform,” but clicking “Iniciar consulta” leads to /offer/ — a chat-like interface branded with Serasa logos, fake “people online” counters, and “Equipe Serasa” imagery. The page harvests CPF numbers (Brazilian tax IDs) via a textbox that submits to /proxy-octahub?cpf=XXXXXXXXXXX on the same domain, which proxies to an external backend at octahub.com.br (IP: 217.21.67.216). The infrastructure uses utmify.com.br for victim tracking (pixel ID 6a26f8518b7dbfbf1c9d770d), capturing IP, geolocation, user agent, and Facebook pixel data. No credential exfiltration to off-primary domains was directly observed — the CPF data goes through the primary domain’s proxy endpoint before reaching the octahub backend.