The full anatomy of a phishing site,
one URL at a time.
ZeroPhish renders the page, runs twelve detection signals against the DOM, certificate chain, brand fingerprint and threat feeds, and returns a typed verdict. Built for security teams and product engineers.
Phishing detected
| URL | hxxps://74-248-32-242[.]cprapid[.]com/de/kasse[.]php | |
| Host | 74-248-32-242[.]cprapid[.]com | |
| Registered domain | cprapid[.]com | |
| Brand | DPD | |
| Screenshot | https://cdn.zerophish.ai/6c78b913-a892-4574-8d0e-3ff75d9fe2a6.jpg | |
| Scan ID | bc69ccde-f8f7-4222-be43-fc2b75d5f58f |
|
445 d ago
|
PHISHING | fm-att.50-6-202-102.cprapid.com | view → |
| Host | 74-248-32-242.cprapid.com |
| Registered domain | cprapid.com |
| Scheme | https |
| Content length | 80170 B |
| HTTP | 200 · text/html |
| DMARC policy | none |
| SPF policy | none |
| MX records | none |
The page presents itself as a DPD checkout (“💳 DPD Kasse”) where you must “Geben Sie Ihre Kartendaten ein” (enter your card details) and then “Pay securely.” It includes a full payment/credential collection form with fields for cardholder name, card number, expiration date, and “Security code (CVV),” plus payment method branding (Visa/Mastercard/Amex/Maestro) and badges like “PCI DSS compliant” and “3D Secure,” indicating a classic card-skimming phishing flow.
A major red flag is the hosting domain: the URL is 74-248-32-242.cprapid.com/de/kasse.php, which is not a DPD-registered domain (DPD uses dpd.com in the page’s own footer links and email). The mismatch between the DPD branding in the UI and the non-DPD domain used to serve the payment form strongly suggests the site is impersonating DPD to harvest payment data.
Overall, the combination of a believable brand-themed checkout UI, direct collection of card credentials, and a suspicious non-brand domain hosting the form leads to a phishing verdict with medium confidence.
This is a confirmed DPD-branded phishing page hosted on 74-248-32-242.cprapid.com (IP 74.248.32.242). The frontend at /de/kasse.php collects full credit card details (cardholder name, card number, expiry date, CVV) under the guise of a DPD parcel payment. Upon submission, the card data is POSTed in plaintext to /de/action.php on the same host, which then redirects to /de/auth.php — a fake “Payment in progress” stall screen showing a fabricated transaction ID. No off-host credential exfiltration was observed; the attacker stores credentials on the same server. The page is tracked by multiple analytics services (dtscout.com, mrktmtrcs.net, amung.us) that profile victims. Legitimate DPD assets from www.dpd.com are hotlinked to enhance the illusion of authenticity.